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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DONA R. BULLOCK, ) 
P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, j 
vs. ) Case No. 
13697 
HERBERT JOHN UNGRICHT, et al., ) 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant reaffirms the statement of facts set 
forth in the opening "BRIEF OF APPELLANT" heretofore filed and 
disagrees with everything contained in the statement of facts 
set forth in "BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS" in conflict therewith. In 
the interest of time and space, however, appellant will not 
methodically refer to each inaccuracy contained in the statement 
of facts in the "BRIEF OF RESPONDENT", but will identify these 
inaccuracies in the argument hereinafter set forth. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
This reply brief will be confined to a reply to the 
arguments of the respondents found under "POINT III" and "POINT 
IV" set forth in the "BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS" and, for clarity, said 
points will be given corresponding numbers in this reply brief. 
1 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY ALLOWED THE INTRODUC-
TION OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE PETITION IN BANK-
RUPTCY FILED BY THE APPELLANT. 
The plaintiff answered the question pertaining to the 
filing of a bankruptcy petition by her in April of 1971 before 
counsel had the opportunity to object thereto (T395: 28-30) but 
counsel thereupon objected thereto upon the grounds said evidence 
was irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial. (T396: 9-10) The 
court overruled the objection. (T396: 11) 
It is significant to observe that the bankruptcy 
petition filed by the appellant was filed eight months before 
the occurrence of the collision involved in this litigation. 
Supposedly, counsel for respondents was seeking to show some 
relevancy between the filing of said bankruptcy petition and the 
pain and suffering sustained by the appellant as a result of the 
automobile collision. Appellant was asymptomatic until the 
collision. (T340: 20-30 and T341: 1-6) The testimony of the 
appellant, however, was to the effect that any emotional upset 
which she suffered in connection with her financial difficulties 
was remedied by the filing of the bankruptcy petition. (T396: 18) 
Counsel for respondents, however, in his desire to prejudice the 
appellant in the eyes of the jurors, then asked the appellant if 
it was not a fact that two creditors had filed actions against 
her wherein they contended that the obligations incurred to them 
by the appellant had been as the result of "misrepresentation." 
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(T396: 19-24) An objection was immediately made to this line of 
questioning (although the record incorrectly indicates that the 
objection was made by Mr, Eyre), pointing out that counsel was 
going into a matter completely unrelated to the case at bar. 
(T396: 25) At this point the trial judge called counsel to the 
bench and an off~the-record discussion was held between court and 
counsel. (T397: 8-9) During this off-the-record discussion, 
counsel for respondents exhibited to court and counsel the docu-
ments which have heretofore in prior briefs been referred to as 
proffered exhibit 12-D. These documents consisted of findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and a judgment in two separate cases, 
wherein it was found by the court that appellant was guilty of 
misrepresentation to each of the plaintiffs therein for the 
reason that she had improperly signed her husband1s name to the 
loan application and the promissory note in each instance; and 
that, accordingly, the appellant was not entitled to a discharge 
from these debts in her aforesaid bankruptcy proceeding* Counsel 
for appellant pointed out that such evidence was highly inflam-
matory, would result in extreme prejudice to the appellant and 
would cause the trial of the case to go off on a tangent which 
would result in a completely erroneous verdict. Counsel for 
appellant even offered at that time to withdraw any claim for 
lost earnings, since the court had indicated he felt there might 
be some materiality in connection with that issue. The trial 
court then stated that he would allow counsel for respondents at 
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that time to inquire of the appellant as to whether or not two 
judgments were obtained against her by the plaintiffs in said 
proffered exhibits* Shortly thereafter court was recessed for 
the day and counsel were requested to remain so that counsel for 
respondents could offer the aforesaid findings of fact and judg-
ments into evidence and have same marked as "12-0". (T398: 16-27 
and T399: 1-4) Since counsel for appellant had not seen these 
documents before, the Court allowed him to withdraw them for the 
evening for the purpose of reading same, indicating that the 
next day the Court would determine whether said proffered exhibit 
had any probative value either on the question of the lost earn-
ings of the appellant or on the matter of the credibility of the 
appellant. (T399: 8-15) 
The next day counsel for appellant renewed the objection 
to the bankruptcy evidence, requesting that it be stricken, and 
also objected to the introduction of the proffered 12-D, the 
highly inflammatory and prejudicial evidence which counsel for 
respondents was seeking to introduce• An extensive discussion 
of these matters by counsel and the Court will be found in the 
record, commencing at page 412, line 11 and extending over to 
page 436, line 4# During the course of this discussion, counsel 
for appellant stated that if the bankruptcy evidence were allowed 
to remain in, it would be necessary for appellant to offer 
evidence explaining the bankruptcy, pointing out that there was 
an explanation and pointing out that in spite of all the sales 
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which the appellant made as a result of her sales ability, a 
loss was sustained because of top-heavy overhead expenses. 
(T427: 10-19; T431: 21-30 to T432: 1-6) Counsel for appellant 
stressed the necessity for going into an explanation of the 
bankruptcy if it were going to be allowed to remain in evidence, 
it being necessary to show why the bankruptcy was filed, why 
schedule C was as it was, etc. He further pointed out that he 
had ffno idea of what we will get into from that point on.ff 
(Underlining added) 
The trial court declared that if counsel for appellant 
sought to go into an explanation of the bankruptcy matter, the 
court would allow 12-D into evidence. The brief of respondents 
seeks to "soft-pedal11 this shocking ruling by taking out of 
context only a portion of what the trial court said in this 
regard. (Brief of respondents, page 5) The position of the 
trial court is made very clear by a reading of the complete 
discussion of that subject. (T434: 1-17) It is clear that the 
trial court definitely and positively used the proffered 12-D as 
a threat and sword over the head of the appellant to keep the 
appellant from offering any explanation of the bankruptcy, thus, 
effectively keeping the appellant from rehabilitating herself in 
the eyes of the jurors. The court very properly did not allow 
12-D into evidence but used the threatened admission of said 
exhibit into evidence as a very effective method of preventing 
any explanation by the appellant as to why the bankruptcy was 
5 
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filed. The record makes it clear that she had a valid explana-
tion, as hereinbefore mentioned. 
Furthermore, the record is clear on the fact that the 
trial court considered bankruptcy a "dirty word" and that it was 
detrimental to the credibility of the appellant. (T434: 24-25; 
T435: 3-4) It is also significant to note that the trial court 
refused to permit appellant to withdraw any claim for loss of 
earnings, even though opposing counsel was perfectly agreeable 
to this withdrawal. (T432: 7-20; T433: 10-20) This was certainly 
a strange position for the trial court to take. It appears that 
the trial court was trying to find a justification for leaving 
the prejudicial bankruptcy evidence before the jury. The 
injection of the bankruptcy into this trial was erroneous and 
highly prejudicial and was designed to prejudice the case of the 
appellant. The trial court felt that it was relevant on the 
matter of the credibility of the appellant and it is obvious that 
the jurors felt the same. The facts of the accident were very 
clearly related by the appellant and would require a verdict in 
her favor, but the prejudice injected into this case by the bank-
ruptcy, without any opportunity to explain why bankruptcy was 
taken, caused the jurors to cool toward the appellant and to 
doubt her integrity. While this had nothing whatsoever to do 
with the facts of this automobile collision, it caused the jurors 
to question appellantfs credibility to the extent that the jury 
never got beyond the liability question. The question of any 
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supposed effect of financial or emotional problems upon the 
injuries sustained in the collision was never even reached by the 
jury. Counsel for respondents announced that he sought to intro-
duce the evidence because of the adverse effect it would have 
upon the case of the appellant. (T426: .7-2) He sought to attack 
the credibility of appellant by evidence of a specific instance 
of her conduct, contrary to Rule 22(d) of Utah Rules of Evidence* 
The error of the trial court in permitting the bankruptcy 
evidence to remain before the jury was highly prejudicial to 
the case of the appellant and the additional gross error of the 
court in refusing to permit appellant to offer any explanation 
of the bankruptcy without precipitating the introduction of the 
admittedly improper 12-D into evidence was highly prejudicial to 
the case of the appellant* There is no question that these errors 
prevented the appellant from receiving a favorable verdict in 
this case and that had these prejudicial errors not been commit-
ted, there would have been a different verdict* 
IV 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED THE PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The trial court was afforded the opportunity to rectify 
this gross miscarriage of justice by granting a new trial and 
permitting appellant to try her case without the aforesaid 
improper attack upon her credibility. The trial court, however, 
saw fit to stand firm in its position. This was error. The 
purpose of a motion for a new trial is to rectify wrongs before 
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it is necessary to seek the help of the Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
It is not necessary to cite further authorities than 
are already cited in the previous briefs. Appellant does not 
take issue with any of the rules of law contained in the brief 
of respondents. Those very rules cited by respondents make it 
clear that a judgment should not be disturbed unless it is shown 
that there is "error" which is "substantial11 and "prejudicial" 
in the sense that it appears that there is a "reasonable likeli-
hood" that the result would have been different in the absence 
of such error. This is precisely the situation we have here. 
The errors hereinbefore described were substantial and prejudi-
cial and there is not only a "reasonable" likelihood that the 
result would have been different in the absence of such errors, 
but there is no question that the result would have been different 
in the absence of such errors. 
The appellant seeks nothing more than a fair trial and 
an opportunity to have her legal rights determined in the absence 
of prejudice and inflammatory innuendoes. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the judgment 
of the trial court should be reversed and that this case should 
be remanded for another trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HATCH & PLUMB 
WINSTON A. LANGLOia? 
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